' MALE 1,AROR FORCE PAR'I'1C:IPATION l 9 education, and, more tentatively, health status as ~n a j o r determinants of labor-force participation in this age group. Monroe Berkowitz and VVilliarn G. Johnson (1974 ), Xlichael Grossman and Lee Benham (1974 ), Richard Scheffler and George Iden (1974 ), Karen Scllrvab (1974 , Harold I,uft (1975) , and Donald Par-sons (197 7) have documented the importance of health f'actors in ~n a l e labor force behavior.' Xlost of the f'actors identified, however, have secular trends which ~vould induce increased labor force participatio~i. Tlle fraction of married males in these age groups has generally increased, and education levels and health conditions have i~npr-oved, all of which would tend to raise participation.
T h e recent literature on intrafamily t i~n e allocations would seem a more attractive starting point, a priori, since female labor force participation has risen substantially over this period. Empirical studies, including several 011 the data set analyzed below, however-, indicate a very modest response (if any) of male labor force bellavior-to variations in female ~nar-ket opportunities or-actual work e f f o r t . T l l e fact that male nonparticipants are disproportionately black, a group for whom female labor force participation has risen only slightly, and unmarried also argues against this cause, at least as the principal source of ~n a l e labor for-ce withdrawal.
T h e sharp rise in the availability of transfer incorne o r welfare over this period is another plausible causal factor. A number of studies have identified welfare levels for the aged (Old Age Assistance) and Social Security benefits as hctors in reducing the labor supply of the elderly."he excellent research on male labor supply motivated by the desire to predict labor supply responses to a negative incorne tax suggests a nodes st sensitivity of prime-aged male labor supply to welfare programs. However-, these studies focus on work hours of employed males, eliminating those out of the labor for-ce either explicitly or implicitly (through deletion of males who declare thernselves to be in poor health)."
In the nest section additional evidence is presented which indicates the importance of welfare prograrns in the male nonpar-ticipation 'The classic work b! Steiner and Dorfmari (1957) stresses the importance of health factors in the labor marlier b e h a~i o r of the aging. Barfield arid Morgari (1969) reactecl to this emphasis b) establishirig the importance of financial variables in the decision to leave the labor force. Barfield and hlorgan recoricile their firidirigs with those of Steiner ancl Dorfnlan b\ noting that adequate retirement income makes feasible the worker's desire to withdraw from work when in poor health.
"See Ashenf'elter and Heckman (1974 ), Kniesner (1976 ). and Cogan (1978 . Parsons (1977) considers the specific question of family effects on male labor withdrawal in response to the onset of poor health.
Beyond the worli cited in n. 2 , see, particularl!. Bosliin (1977) , Bosliin ancl Hurcl (1977), Parsons (19786) . and Burkhauser (in press).
: 'See, e.g.. Cain and \Vatts (1973) and references therein. decision. Census data reveal that labor for-ce witllctra~val of pr-imeaged rnales is concentrated among individuals with the lobvest income potential. An analysis of income sources for-males out of the laborfor-ce identifies welfare and, niore par-ticular-ly, Social Securit)-disability payrnents as the principal compensating income lor loss of ear-ned income. T h e sharp rise in ~n a l e recipients under this program (l'rom its inception in 1937, the number-of disabled male recipients has r-isen to 1.7 tnillion in December-1975 , o r about 8.5 percent of the male population aged 43-64) would seem to further confirm the irnportance of this factor. I n Section I1 a labor fbrce participation model clesigned to capture the incentive structure of the Social Security disability progr-an1 is presented and then estimated using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of older males (4.5-50 in 1966, the first year of the panel sur-vey)." T h e po~verful influence on participation of the gener-osity of' transfers in this population is confir-rnecl. Finally, in Section I11 the cross-sectional model is put to the difficult test o f "pr-edicting" labor-torce participation over the period 1948-76. T h e model predictions conform ~vell with actual labor fi)rce participation over the period. Tlle recent decline in labor force participation of prime-aged males can be largely explained as the response of primeaged males in poor health and ~vith low iricotne potential to incr-easingly attractive welfare opportunities.
I. The Characteristics of Nonparticipants in the Market
Pr-ime-aged male nonparticipants in the labor force are heavily concentrated among one gr-oup, those with the lowest potential market earnings. This relationship is apparent in U.S. census data. I n table 2 nonparticipation r-ates are presented by schoolitig and age in 1960 and 1970. Nonparticipation is clearly concentrated in the lowschooling-attainment groups. Even in the 35-44 age interval, the nonpar-ticipation rate of males ~vitll 0-7 year-s of schooling was 15 percent in 1970, XIen in the low-schooling groups, tnor-eover, ar-e not onl?. more likel?. to be out of the market: the?. are withdr-awing at a more rapid I-ate than ar-e Inore highly educated Inen. 'I'he change in nonparticipation bet~veen 1960 and 1970 among males of different levels of schooling attainment is reported in table 2, column 3.
A comparison of the sources and magnitude of family income of older males in and out of the market provides insight into the economic penalties associated ~vith labor force withdra~val as well as the hlALF LABOR FOR('F PAR' ITC:IPATIOS 1 2 1 progr-ams which cushion the male earnings loss.' In a predominantly rnarket economy a n d , indeed, in most economies, the principal source of family i r~c o~n e market consumption acti\,ities is the labor and ear-nings of family nlembers, particularly the adult male. T h e question arises whether and how the fa~nily can "affi)r-d" to ha1.e the adult male out of the labor force. Is consu~nption cor-I-espondingly reduced? Are the ear-nings of' other family ~nernbers increased through their reduced leisure and home activities? Do various transfer programs largely compensate f-or the reduced earnings?
Inconie data from the NLS provide answers to these questions. Xlean famil) income in 1965 was approximately $4,000 tor white fanlilies \%.it11 the older-male out of the labor for-ce during the survey week, $9,000 if'the white male was in the labor force. Farnilv income Sot nrk -N.itlo(lal I . < i n g~r u~l~~i a l Sur\r\5 was $5,600 and $2,400 for-black families with the male in and out of the laboi-force, respectively. Even controlling for schooling differences in the two laboi-force status groups, the difference in earnings is approximately 50 percent.
In table 3, the sources of income for this age cohort are presented by labor force status and race. T h e principal elenlent in the reduced family earnings when the older-male is not in the labor force during the sur\,ey week is, logically enough, reduced male earnings. Such earnings contribute only 13 percent of total income for ~vhite families, 6 percent for black families, when the older male is out o f t h e labor fbrce during the sui-\ey ~veek.
T h e earnings of other f'a~nily ~nembers as a share of family income rise from 19 percent and 22 percent for ~vhites and blacks, respectively, in the labor force to 33 percent and 25 percent for ~vhites and blacks out of the labor force. T h e categories which might suggest voluntary 1-etirement-pensions, rent, interest, and dividends-repi-esent less than 18 percent of the income of whites out of the laboiforce and 4 percent o f t h a t of' blacks. Labor force withdrawal does not appear to be an early (private) retirement phenomenon.
Social welfare programs account for 33 percent of'the f'amily earnings of whites out of'the labor fbrce and a full 39 percent fr blacks.
Of' these, disability payments are the largest part, accounting for 29 percent and 48 percent of family earnings for whites and blacks, respectively. General welfare accounts for 4 percent and 10 percent of f'amily earnings for the two groups. Xlost such programs have of course been specifically designed to disallow aid to families with healthy, ~vorking-aged males present. Since the disability programs provide such a large part of' the income of' workers out of' the labor fhrce, it ~vould seem usefill to specit). in more detail the types of' prograrns \vhich channel the largest aInounts of' funds to families ~vith prime-aged males out of the labor force. The percentage breakclolvns of disability payment by program are reported in table 4. It beco~nes clear fl-o~n table 4 that more than half' the aid to the disabled comes frorn Social Security, 55 percent for whites and 60 percent thr blacks. Veteran's co~npensation accounts for an additional 25 pel-cent, \vhich is larger than the combiriecl total of' tlie contributions of' the remaining programs.
The Labor Force Participation Decision
Since Social Security disability benefits are the major element in trarisfers to prime-aged males out of' the labor force, I focus below on modeli~lg the economic incentive structure of that program. Three aspects of the program are particularly important. First, benefits are health dependent. In the Social Security program, disability is defined as "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any ~neclically determinable physical or mental i~npairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last thr a continuous period of not less than 12 months" (Social Security Administration 1969, p. 98).
Second, the benefits have an ele~nerit of' uncertainty since eligibility may or may not be a\va~-ded. The ~vorker must be certified as "disabled." The Social Security Adrniriistration ultimately decides \vhether the worker is disabled, and the rejection rate of' clairns for disability benefits is high. In 1975, for example, 60 percent of all "initial determinations" on disability applications were denials (T'reitel
1976). Since engaging in substantial gainful ernploynlent is solid evidence that one is capable of doing so, the individual obviously must not be ivorking a significant amount during the determination period. Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits, for example, requires proof of "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity," and indeed, during the early years ofthe program, earning as little as $100 per month was deerned sufficient to d i s p r o~e such inability, ivhile earning $50-$100 was felt to be anlbiguous.
Third, the co~nmitrnent to leave the labor force is at least semipermanent. For eligibility, the disability must be expected to last 12 rnonths or more. Moreover, there is a 5-month ivaiting period before benefits are paid (6 months lvere required during t l~e sarnple period analy~ed. beloiv). The permanence of' the labol-force ivithdra~val is apparent in the number of ~veeks spent in the labor force during the past year by older males out of the labor torce during the survey ~veek. About 80 percent ivorked no weeks in 1965. Of' those in the labor force, about 80 pel-cent worked 50-52 weeks. The analysis can be treated, therefore, largely as a labor force participation choice.
How ~v i l lthis incentive structure influence the prime-aged male's labor supply decision? T h e individual may be characterized ~vithin this econoniic environment as choosing one of' tivo possible courses of action, either to participate in the labor market or not. The rewards associated ivith not participating are uncertain at the time the decision must be made, since welfare payments are highel-if' the individual is certified by the Social Security Administration as being disabled. Assume that, for a given health condition, cu claims itre accepted and transfers o f T p paid ~vhile ( 1 -a ) clairns are rejected and transfers of T I Pare paid, rvhere T p > T,,.
Xssurning the individual is an expected utility maxi~nizer, he will choose to leave the labor force if ~vhereE = the expectation operator and E --a random element, reflecting, perhaps, randomness in applying the decision rule. In the empirical anal!.sis it rvill reflect, as rvell, unmeasurecl elements rvhich influence work behavior (social pressure, tastes, etc.). T h e decision rule simply states that, subject to sorne random error, the worker will choose to be out of'the labor force only if the expected value of being out is higher than that of being in.
If one ignores rando~nness in market earnings, the utility level of the individual in the labor force is known rvith certainty and in the traditional framelvork is dependent on his earnings (zuX,where w = rvage rate andX --work hours) and on his leisure time (Il -X, where h
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-t otal time available). .I'he expected utility of leaving the market is the weighted average of utility if the worker's claim is accepted arid utility if' it is not, \vliere the ~veights are a and 1 -a , respectively.
T h e decision rule, then, can be Inore specifically characteri/ed its: leave the niitrket if' I\-here, again, a ( H ) = probability of' being certified as in poor health, given health condition H ; T i = transfer benefit received if'certitiecl in poor health (i = P ) or not (i = .\'P); h = total available hours; Xmarket work hours; and ;(I = Ivage rate. In the population, then, the probability of nonparticipation will be represented by:
where / and F represent the density and cumulative function, respectivel), of E.
.I'he theoretical predictions of the rnodel are straightfbr\vard. T h e probability of nonparticipation in the labor ti~rce ~vill r-ise \vith (i) a decline in health; (ii) lo\ver Ivages; (iii) higher transfers, in either o r both outcornes of' certification of poor health; and (iv) higher probabilit! of being certified in poor health.
?'he data set ~vhich \vill be used to estimate the labor fi)l-ce participation equation is again the older men's sample of the X I S , a IO-year panel survey of males 45-59 in 1966 , the initial yeal-of the survey. T h e analysis \\.ill focus on the determination of 1969 labor force participation. T h e panel aspect of the data \vill be used in t~v o important \vays. First, the measures of' market opportunity used in the stud\.-\vage rate and unemployment experience-are constructecl from 1966 measures, 3 years prior to the analysis, in ordel-to reduce censoring problerns. That is, a majorit!-of individuals out of' the market in 1969, who have no recorded Ivage in 1969 as a result, d o have a usable 1966 response. Obviously, irldividuals with long-term absences frorn the rnarket are unclerrepresented.8
Second, the panel aspect of the data is used to construct an objective measure of health condition fbr individuals in the sample. T h e rneasurement of health condition is a clif'ficult but important task. 111 the 'l'he use of prior wage rates itsell in\ol\es a misspecihcatio~r it current (actual or potential) wage rates is the Lariahle appropriate to the current economic decision.
J O U R N A L OF P O L I T I ( : A L E C O S O M Y
NLS, as in most large-scale labor market surveys, the only direct health measures are self-reported. Such measures are not likely to be co~npletelyaccurate in the best of circu~nstances. hlol-e damaging, the health estitriates may be biased by economic i~lcentives to misreport. Since the clinical determination of' poor health is inexact, and since clisability beliefits are paid only to those detel-mined to be in poor health arnong those ~v h o claim to be in poor health, a n otherwisehealthy i~lclividual ~v h o decides to leave the labor torce has an incentive to declare himself in poor health. T h e declaration of pool-health is therefore an econo~nic phenomenon, one that confounds the analysis of the econornic determinants of' labor force participation (Parsons 1979) .
T h e panel aspect of the NLS provides, however, an indirect measure which 2,s objective, mortality experience subsequent to the period of analysis. In particular, mortality durnrnies a r e introduced into a model of' labor fhrce participation for year of death if' the respondent cliecl during a particular interval bet\veen intervielv dates. A single mortality index is then constructed using a \veighted average of these clurnmies where the ~veights are the coefficients of the dununies in the ~noclel, n o r m a l i~e d by the coefficient on the labor fhrce participation effect of death between 1969 and 197 1 , the first (attempted) reinterview date."
T h e structure of the error tern1 E in the labor force participation model (eq. [3]) cletel-mines the appropriate mode of estimation. In the empirical I V~I -k reported. in this section it is assumecl that the error term is nol-mally distributed so that probit analysis is the indicated procedure.
Probit estimates of a simple ~noclel of labor force participation are reported in table 5 thr two different specifications of A : a linear model (col. I ) and a health-price interaction model (col. 2). 'I'he latter model tests the proposition that the economic incentive effects are larger in absolute v:ilue tor individuals in poor health. T h e econo~nic variables included in the analysis a r e potential Social Security benefits and an index of local welfare generosity (annual AFDC and General Assistance payments per poverty farnil? within a state), both nor~nalized by the i~lcliviclual's \vage rate (constructed from 1966 reported Ivage rate), and the fl-action of the year une~nployed in 1966.10 T h e neth hod !' l'he n~ortalit) index (.LIOR7',4LITI') is as follotvs:
"' '1 he "replacernerlc" ratio is used here in large part hecause ot tollinearicy problems \vhich arise i f wages a n d benehts are entered separatel). to the hourli u.!ge r.!te lirc Al>prnrl~x) * I he ratw ,)I l<~cal uelt'ire to thc houri\ u q e r.!te (~e e .Apper~cI~x) t l h r I~a r t l o~r of thc \car ~i r i c n r p l <~i e d . of construction of' the variables is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. r h e results in the linear A model are strongly consistent \vith the model. Levels of potential Social Security benefits a n d co~n~nuriity ~velfare (relative to market wage opportunities) and prior une~nploy-ment experience all have statistically significant negative coefficients in the labor force participation model. T h e mortality index also is significantly negative. T h e elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to the "replacernent ratio," the ratio of' Social Security benefits to the rvage rate, evaluated at the Inearl values of'the variables in the analysis, is -0.63. T h e disincentive effect of transfer payment levels is significant even in a transfer program rigidly conditioned b>. health status.
T h e interaction model, colurnn 2, confirms that the Social Security and \velf'are disincentive effects rise with increases in poor health. T h e partial derivative of' the probability of' labor force participation \vith respect to the replacement ratio rises frorn 0.04 if the individual is alive at the encl of the intervie\\, pel-iocl (1976) to 0.77 if' the inclividual clies within 2 years of' the 1969 intel-view (at the mean level of other independent variables). (;leal-ly, the label-force participation of' prirne-agecl males is significantly affected. by economic incentives to remain o r \vithcl~-aw f'rom the labor torce." LYhether this simple price model is capable of' "pl-edicting" the trend in participation is a cluestion we shall tul-11 to in the next section.
Trends in Nonparticipation
Since the motivation of this stucly is the explanation of recent increases in rionparticipatiori in the labol-force among prime-aged males, the question n a t u r a l l~ arises of' how ~vell the model estimated above preclicts recent trends in nonparticipation. In this section I will 111-qject expected noriparticipation rates for the NLS sample over the pel-iocl 1948-76 using the 1969 estimated. labor tor-ce participation model and then compare these projections with actual labor force behavior by this group. T h e correspondence, o r lack thereof, of the projections ancl actual behavior will provide a po~verful test o f the \-alidity of the underlying model. T h e ability to "explain" time-series trends is, of course, a difficult test for any cross-sectional ~noclel. T h e effects of factors which are constant at any point in time but vary over time cannot be estimatecl in a cross-sectional analysis. In the present case, the relative severity of the medical determirlation of' disability ~i n d e r Social Security is one potentially important tactor that may be reasonably unif'orm at a point in tirne yet vary significantly over time. Second, the crosssectional analysis is assumecl to be esti~nated on a sample in long-run equilibrium and therefore provides n o information on the acljustment lags of behavior, in this case labor fhrce participation, behind changes in market conditions. Time-series projections were constructed over the periocl 1938-76 in the follo~ving fhshion. IncIi\id~ials in the sample in 1969 were assumecl to have behavioral patterns specified by the price-health model of' labor force participation reported in table 5 , column 2. Among the independent variables, age is helcl constant since I \vish to characteri~e the behavior of individuals of a given age. Trends in the remaining independent variables Ivere constructed. For mortality, welfare, and \vage rates, the base-year (1969) values rvere ad.justed for each individual by trends in closely related, consistent series. T h e wage rate for each year fhr a given intlividr~al, tbr example, is his 1966 vage rate tirnes the ratio of personal per capita income in the year in c1~iestio11 to personal per capita income in 1966. Potential Social Security benefits were estimated using the projected \vage in the appropriate fhrm~ila for Social Security benefits in the >,ear in question.
T h e predicted values of'nonparticipation f'l-orn the sample of' males aged 48-62 are cornpared with actual trends for males aged 45-54 in the Unitecl States in figlire 1. T h e series upon which the graph is based ancl the series which went illto its construction are reported in the Appendix. T h e correspondence over Inost of the period is quite satistactory. T h e cross-sectional projections woulcl predict that nonparticipation \voulcI rise o\-er this 30-year period from 2.7 percent to 8.6 percent. T h e actual rise tvas trom 4.2 percent to 8.4 percent.
T h e corresporitlence is particularly close over the last decade, \vhich inclutles, not iricitlentally, the base year of' 1969. T h e projections indicate a rise in nonparticipation from 5.35 percent in 1966 to 8.6 percent in 1976. T h e actual rise \vas from 4.7 percent to 8.4 percent.
T h e onl! major deviation occurs during the periotl in~n~erliately follo~ving the inception of the Social Security disability program. T h e disability program becarne available to \vorkers aged 50-64 in mid-1957, to \vorkers of all ages in late 1960. T h e cross-sectional estimates .jump immediately to a level ~vhich in fbct was not act~ially obtained for a decade. Whether a 10-year acljustment lag is plausible fhr a radically nelv 111-ogram" 01-~v hethersome unmeasured component of' the system (e.g., the severity of the health test) limited early availability of the progl-atn is obviously a matter of conjecture.
IV. Conclusion
T h e recent increase in nonparticipation in the labor force of primeaged nlales can apparently be largely explainetl by the increased generosit). of social rvelfare tt-ansfers, particularlt. Social Sec~lrity disability payments. Census tlata indicate that nonparticipatiotl in 1970, as well as decreases in participation over the decade 1960-70, is cot~centratecl among lo~v-schooling (low-income-potential) groups. An analysis of income sources h o t n the NLS identified Social Security and other disability payments as the principal income offset to lost earnings anlong prime-aged rnales currently out of the labor force.
T h e fact that Social Security benefits have become increasingly generous and increasingly l~rogressive (lo~v-\vage workers have relatively high benefits) suggests the hypothesis that this program has ( 1 ) induced ei-er-larger numbers of \vorkers to lea\-e the labor fhrce and (2) differentially affected. lo~v-wage \vorkers.
A multivariate analysis of labor force participation of males aged 48-62 in 1969 confirms these two hypotheses. T h e ratio of potential Social Security benefits to the market wage has a large estimated effect on the participation decision. For the average individual in the satnple, a 10 percent increase in benefits without a corresponding rise in wage rates ~v i l l induce a 6 percent rise in nonparticipation. High levels of general welfare payments in the community, as well as past Linernployment experience, also discourage labor force attachment.
T o test the validity of this explanation as an explanation of the trends in notly>artici~>atiot~, nlale nonparticipation rates are projected
